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Rejecting Conventional Wisdom:
Federalist Ambivalence in the Framing
and Implementation of Article V
by KURT T. LASHI
INTRODUCTION
In 1787, the idea of placing an amending provision in a constitution
was uncontroversial. Popular sovereignty was an assumed doctrine in the
colonies; the people retained the unalienable right "to alter or abolish"
their system of government whenever they so pleased. How this unques-
tionable right was to be incorporated into the new federal Constitution,
however, was another matter. The delegates who faced each other at
Philadelphia had very different views about which body should be
entrusted with the power to propose amendments, when that power should
be used, and how that power should be defined.
Article V, like the rest of the Constitution, reflects a mixture of com-
promise and ingenuity. The delegates sought a national government
strong enough to overcome the problems of the Articles of Confederation,
yet with enough of a federal structure to placate Antifederalist fears of de
facto "consolidation" of the states. By creating a dual triggering mecha-
nism, one that could be "pulled" by either the states or the federal govern-
ment, Article V satisfied both nationalist and statist that "amendments of
the proper kind" would be put before the people.
The polarities in the convention, however, were more than national-
ist versus statist, or large state versus small. The debates that swirled
within and around Philadelphia reveal competing conceptions of govern-
ment: Classical Republicanism which presumed a virtuous citizenry who
could be expected to sacrifice parochial concerns in the pursuit of a com-
mon good, versus the emerging Liberal assumption that society was com-
posed of factions whose competitions could be, and must be, structured so
as to achieve a stable form of government.
This clash between Liberal and Republican assumptions became
especially acute in the debates surrounding the first attempted use of
Article V: the Antifederalist call to a second convention. Seeing only
"discord and ferment" coming from a second convention, the Federalists
1. Associate Professor, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. B.A., Whitman College, 1989.
J.D., Yale Law School 1992. 1 would like to thank Bruce A. Ackerman and Akhil R. Amar
for their guidance in the preparation of this article. Thanks also to the editorial staff of the
American Journal of Legal History for their thoughtful comments. Finally, this piece is dedi-
cated to the unflagging and undeserved support and inspiration of Kelly C. Lash.
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articulated a new and darker view of conventions: Is there any guaranty
that a national convention will result in the considered judgment of the
people? How can the assembly avoid being dominated by faction and
demagoguery? The shadow thus cast over the convention clause of Article
V has extended far beyond the Founding. It has obscured from view what
was to Eighteenth Century Americans the fundamental expression of the
"language of democracy," the people's right to assemble apart from estab-
lished institutions and determine their own form of government.
II
CREATING ARTICLE V
A. Constitutions and Conventions
The 18th century English conception of a constitution was "that
Assemblage of Laws, Institutions and Customs . . . that compose the
General System, according to which the Community hath agreed to be
governed." 2 A constitution, however, was not considered superior to the
government or ordinary enactments of Parliament.3
In America, constitutions came to mean much more. By 1678, the
colonies regarded constitutions as written codes of government apart from
legislative enactment. 4 The hallmark for distinguishing constitutional
from legislative acts was the use of a specially designated body for gener-
ating constitutional law-the convention. 5 Although out of the legisla-
ture's reach under ordinary conditions, the output of these conventions
was never out of reach of the people themselves. In eighteenth century
America, the sovereignty of the people was taken for granted-the people
might "alter or abolish" their system of government whenever and howev-
er they saw fit.6 According to James Wilson, "[a]s our constitutions are
2. Henry St. John (Viscount Bolingbroke), A Dissertation upon Parties 108 (3rd ed.,
London, 1735), cited in Russell L. Caplan, Constitutional Brinknanship: Amending the
Constitution by National Convention 3 (Oxford 1988) (hereinafter cited as "CAPLAN").
3. Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 260-261 (1969)
(hereinafter cited as "WOOD"). "The constitution is one principal division, head, section, or
title of the code of publick laws, distinguished from the rest only by the particular nature, or
superiour importance of the subject, of which it treats. Therefore the tenns constitutional and
unconstitutional, mean Legal and illegal." William Paley, The Principles of Moral and
Political Philosophy (Philadelphia, 1788).
4. CAPLAN supra note 2, at 4.
5. Taking their cue from the English Convention Parliaments of the mid to late 1600s, the
colonists rehabilitated a term that had originally meant an "irregular assembly" into a body
whose purpose was to establish fundamental law. See WOOD, supra note 3, at 318-19
(1969). See also CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 16. According to Thomas Jefferson, "to render a
form of government unalterable by ordinary acts of assembly, the people must delegate per-
sons with special powers. They have accordingly chosen special conventions to form and fix
their governments. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia 125 (Peden ed.), cited
in WOOD, supra note 3, at 309.
6. The principle was written into the Declaration of Independence: "IWihenever any
Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter
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superior to our legislatures, so the people are superior to our constitutions.
Indeed, the superiority, in the last instance, is much greater, for the people
possess over our constitutions control in act, as well as right." 7 Therefore,
"a constitutional road to the decision of the people ought to be marked out
and kept open, for certain great and extraordinary occasions." 8
This "constitutional road" avoids the dilemma of choosing between
violence or acquiescence should the existing government be found wanti-
ng. 9 The alternative being civil war, 10 thus, providing a means for amend-
ing their constitution was "a principle of melioration, contentment, and
peace."l I
B. Precursors of Article V
1. State Constitution Amendment Provisions
The idea of providing for a constitution's amendment within the text
itself was not an idea that had existed from the earliest days of the
colonies. The first American constitutions were based on the theory that
governments once created were immutable. 12 For instance, John Locke's
1669 constitution for the Carolinas stated that it "shall be and remain the
sacred and unalterable form and rule of government of Carolina forev-
er."
13
William Penn drafted the first constitutional amendment provision
for his colony in 1682.14 Following the lead of the Declaration of
Independence,15 eight of the twelve state constitutions written in the first
or abolish it, and to institute a new Government, laying its Foundation on such Principles,
and organizing its Powers in such Form, as to Ihem shall seem most likely to effect their
Safely and Happiness." The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776). See also John
R. Vile, The Constitutional Amending Process in American Political Thought 24 (1992)
(hereinafter cited as "VILE"); Edmund S. Morgan, Inventing the People: The Rise of
Popular Sovereignty in England and America 143 (Norton 1988).
7. 2 The Debates of the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal
Constitution 432 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836) (hereinafter ELLIOT'S DEBATES) (remarks of
James Wilson at Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention).
8. The Federalist Papers No. 49, at 314 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
9. "[It will be better to provide for [constitutional amendments], in an easy, regular and
Constitutional way than to trust to chance and violence." I The Records of the Federal
Convention of 1787 202-03 (Max Farrand ed., Yale, rev. ed. 1937) (hereinafter FARRAND)
(remarks of George Mason at Philadelphia Constitutional Convention).
10. 4 Elliot's Debates, supra note 7, 176-77 (remarks of James Iredell in North Carolina
Ratifying Convention).
11. James Wilson, "Lectures on Law," I Works of Wilson 21 (Wilson ed.), cited in
WOOD, supra note 3, at 614.
12. CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 14.
13. The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina of 1669, Sec 120, reprinted in 2 The
Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the United
States 1408 (B. Poore ed., 2d ed. 1878).
14. See CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 14.
15. VILE, supra note 6, at 24.
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months of independence specified procedures for their own alteration.
Five permitted amendment by convention; three-those of Delaware,
Maryland, and South Carolina-by legislature.16
Pennsylvania's Constitution of 1776 provided for a convention to be
called by the Council of Censors, the members of which would be elected
every seven years to inquire into the conduct of government and to deter-
mine whether "there appear to them an absolute necessity of amending
any article of the constitution which may be defective." 17 The Council
only met twice, in 1783 and 1784, both times failing to achieve the two-
thirds majority needed for calling a convention.18
Delaware's Constitution specified certain articles immune from any
alteration and made the consent of five-sevenths of the Assembly and
seven members of the legislative Council necessary for any amendment of
the remainder of the Constitution.19 The Maryland Constitution could
only be altered by the acts of two consecutively elected legislatures.20 In
Georgia, the Constitution could only be altered by a special convention
called by the assembly after receiving petitions from the voters of a
majority of the counties of the state.2 1 According to Gordon Wood, the
above constitutions were all "rudimentary efforts to make effective the
distinction between the fundamental principles of the constitution and
positive law." 22
2. The Articles of Confederation
Article XIII of the Articles of Confederation provided for their own
amendment, but only if the alteration "be agreed to in a Congress of the
United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the Legislatures of every
State." 23 Unfortunately, the unanimity requirement made the Articles
almost impossible to amend 24 and impeded what was widely regarded as
16. CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 14.
17. Id.
18. Id. The Vermont Constitution of 1786 was patterned after Pennsylvania's and provid-
ed for a Council of Censors who were to meet every seven years and "have power to call a
Convention ... if there appears to them an absolute necessity of amending any article of this
Constitution which may be defective... and of adding such as are necessary for the preser-
vation of the rights and happiness of the people." Vermont Constitution of 1786, ch. 2, art.
40, reprinted in 4 The Founders' Constitution 576 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds.,
Chicago 1987) (hereinafter "The Founders' Constitution").
19. Delaware Constitution of /776, reprinted in, 2 Sources and Documents of the United
States Constitutions 204 (William F. Swindler ed., 1973) (hereinafter "SWINDLER").
20. Maryland Consitution of 1776, reprinted in 4 SWINDLER, supra note 19, at 383.
21. Georgia Constitution of 1777, reprinted in 2 SWINDLER, supra note 19, at 449.
22. WOOD, supra note 3, at 309.
23. The Articles of Confederation (1781) reprinted in I The Documents of Anerican
Constitutional & Legal History 75-76 (Melvin 1. Urofsky ed., 1989).
24. The procedural hurdle in the Articles was widely criticized. At the Philadelphia Con-
vention, Charles Pinckney noted the necessity of "destroy[ing] that unanimity which upon
these occasions the present System has unfortunately made necessary .. .it is this unan-
imous consent, the depressed situation of the Union is undoubtedly owing." Observations on
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necessary expansion of the Confederation's authority to regulate foreign
and domestic trade. 25 For example, measures proposed in 1781 and 1783,
giving Congress the power to tax imports, were both killed by the veto of
one state. 26 Constant deadlocks arose from, "sectional jealousies and a
reluctance by Congress to alienate the states by forcing them to surrender
powers." 27
The crisis involved more than mere political stalemate. The econom-
ic depression which followed the Revolutionary War deeply affected
farmers in the Northeast who were no longer able to repay their creditors
in crops. The resultant forced-sales of land and livestock to raise currency
created widespread resentment and, eventually, mob action designed to
intimidate courts which executed actions against debtors. 28 In Virginia,
mobs closed the courts and burned courthouses and prisons.29 One of
these uprisings, Shay's Rebellion in Massachusetts, came to symbolize
the need for stronger central government and hastened the appointment of
delegates to Philadelphia.30 In fact, it was more than the intractable
Articles and an impotent national government that fueled the drive to
Philadelphia.3 1 It was the "'corruption and mutability of the legislative
Councils of the States' 32 - the "'evils operating in the States"' 33 -that
convinced a reluctant Congress to finally accede to the rising call for a
tile Plan of Government Submitted to the Federal Convention, reprinted in IIl FARRAND,
supr'a note 9, at 120. See also 11 FARRAND, supra note 9, at 558 (remarks of Alexander
Hamilton at the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention) ("It had been wished by many and
was much to be desired that an easier mode for introducing amendments had been provided
by the Articles of Confederation."); The Virginia Ratification Debates (remarks of James
Madison) reprinted in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 7, at 89 ("The inconveniences
resulting from this requisition, of unanimous concurrence in alterations in the Confederation,
must be known to every member in this Convention.").
25. CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 25.
26. Id. at 30 (Rhode Island and New York, respectively). See also The Virginia
Ratification Debates (remarks of James Madison) reprinted in 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES,
supra note 7, at 89 (reminding the convention of the numerous times amendments of the
Articles were defeated by "the smallest state in the Union," and "[w] ould the honorable
gentleman agree to continue the most radical defects in the old system, because the petty
state of Rhode Island would not agree to remove them?").
27. CAPLAN. supra note 2, at 25.
28. Id.
29. MORGAN, supra note 6, at 266.
30. See WOOD, supra note 3, at 465; CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 25.
31. Soon after the Philadelphia Convention, James Madison wrote:
[These vices coming out of state governmentsl, so frequent and so flagrant as to alarm the
most steadfast friends of Republicanism.... contributed more to that uneasiness which pro-
duced Ihe Convention, and prepared the public mind for a general reform, than those which
accrued to our national character and interest from the inadequacy of the Confederation to its
immediate objects.
James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Oct 24, 1787, XII Jefferson Papers 276 (Boyd ed.),
cited in WOOD, supra note 3, at 467.
32. II FARRAND, supra note 9. at 288 (remarks of John Francis Mercer).
33. I FARRAND, starra note 9, at 291 (remarks of Alexander Hamilton).
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national convention. 34
C. The Philadelphia Convention and The Generation of the Text
On May 29, 1787, the governor of Virginia, Edmund Randolph, pre-
sented the following proposal to the Constitutional Convention in
Philadelphia:
Resd. that provision ought to be made for the amendment of the Articles of
Union whensoever it shall seem necessary, and that the assent of the National
Legislature ought not to be required thereto. 35
On June 5, there was a brief discussion of the proposal which now read
"that provision ought to be made for hereafter amending the system now
to be established, without requiring the assent of the Natl. Legislature." 36
Charles Pinckney of South Carolina "doubted the propriety or necessity of
it."37 Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts responded that such a provision
would provide "intermediate stability to the government," and pointed out
that "[n]othing had yet happened in the States where this provision existed
to prove its impropriety." 38 Since the convention was divided, discussion
was postponed "for further consideration." 39
On June 11, the resolution came up again, this time delegates ques-
tioned not only the congressional assent clause, but also the need for an
amending provision at all. 40 In response, George Mason of Virginia
urged the necessity of such a provision. The plan now to be formed will certainly
be defective, as the Confederation has been found on trial to be. Amendments
therefore will be necessary, and it will be better to provide for them, in an easy,
regular and Constitutional way than to trust to chance and violence. It would be
improper to require consent of the Nail. legislature, because they may abuse their
34. The resolution read in full:
Whereas there is provision in the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union for mak-
ing alterations therein by the Assent of a Congress of the United States and of the
Legislatures of the several states.... Resolved that in the opinion of Congress it is expedient
that on the second Monday in May next a Convention of delegates who shall have been
appointed by the several States be held at Philadelphia for the sole and express purpose of
revising the Articles of Confederation and reporting to Congress and the several legislatures
such alterations and provisions therein as shall when agreed to in Congress and confirmed by
the States render the federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of Government and the
preservation of the Union.
5 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 7, at 96. See also CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 26.
35. 1 FARRAND, supra note 9, at 22.
36. Id. at 121. The so-called "Pinckney Plan" specifically provided for Congressional
approval of proposed amendments. See Ill FARRAND, supra note 9, at 120.
Congressionally approved amendments would become part of the Constitution upon being
ratified by an unspecified number of states-there was no provision for state or national con-
ventions. Id. See also id. at 609. The Articles of Confederation also required congressional
approval of proposed amendments, as did the resolution calling for the Philadelphia
Convention. see supra at notes 23 & 35 and accompanying text.
37. I FARRAND, supra note 9, at 121.
38. Id. at 122.
39. Id.
40. Id, at 202.
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power, and refuse their consent on that very account. The opportunity for such an
abuse, may be the fault of the Constitution calling for amendment.41
The Convention voted to approve the general provision but discussion on
the words "without requiring the consent of the Nat'l Legislature" was
once again postponed. 42
By the end of August, the Convention had agreed to the following
language, known at this point as Article XIX:
On the application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the States in the Union, for
an amendment of this Constitution, the Legislature of the United States shall call
a Convention for that purpose. 43
On September 10, Elbridge Gerry moved to reconsider the article. Given
that "[tlhis Constitution ... is to be paramount to the State Constitutions,"
and"that two thirds of the States may obtain a Convention," a majority of
States could therefore "bind the Union to innovations that may subvert the
State-Constitutions altogether." 44 Alexander Hamilton of New York
rejoined that "[t]here was no greater evil in subjecting the people of the
U.S. to the major voice than the people of a particular State." 4 5 Hamilton,
though, found the proposed article inadequate for a different reason:
The State Legislatures will not apply for alterations but with a view to increase
their own powers-The National Legislature will be the first to perceive and will
be most sensible to the necessity of amendments, and ought also to be empow-
ered, whenever two thirds of each branch should concur to call a convention-
There could be no danger in giving this power, as the people would finally decide
in the case. 46
James Madison was troubled by "the vagueness of the terms, 'call a
Convention for the purpose' as sufficient reason for reconsidering the arti-
cle. How was a Convention to be formed? by what rule decide? what the
force of its acts?"' 4 7
After the assembly voted to reconsider the amendment provision,
Roger Sherman of Connecticut moved to add the language "or the
Legislature may propose amendments to the several States for their appro-
bation, but no amendments shall be binding until consented to by the sev-
eral States." 48 Concerned that Sherman's language would repeat the prob-
lem of the immutable Articles, James Wilson of Pennsylvania moved to
41. Id. at 202-03.
42. Id. at 203.
43. I1 FARRAND, supra note 9, at 468. The "two-thirds," or nine states, may have been
taken from Articles IX-XI of the Articles of Confederation, where that number was required
for certain important actions relating to war and coinage. The Articles of Confederation
(1781) reprinted in I Documents of American Constitutional & Legal Histo-y, supra note 23,
at 72-75. See also CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 28.
44. 11 FARRAND, supra note 9, at 557-58.
45. Id. at 558.
46. Id. at 558.
47. Id.
48. Id. Thus responding to both Mr. Gerry's concern about State consent, as well as Mr.
Hamilton's suggestion that the Legislature he given the power to propose amendments.
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insert the words "three fourths of' before "the several States." The motion
passed unanimously. 49
At this point, Madison moved to postpone the consideration of the
amended proposition in order to take up the following:
The Legislatures of the U.S. whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem nec-
essary, or on the application of two thirds of the Legislatures of the several
States, shall propose amendments to this Constitution, which shall be valid to all
intents and purposes as part thereof, when the same shall have been ratified by
three fourths at least of the Legislatures of the several States, or by Conventions
in three fourths thereof, as one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed
by the Legislature of the U.S.50
John Rutledge, of South Carolina, declaring that "he could never agree to
give a power by which the articles relating to slaves might be altered by
States not interested in that property," moved to add "provided that no
amendments which may be made prior to the year 1808 shall in any man-
ner affect the fourth and fifth sections of the VII article." 51 The article
was then postponed for further consideration of Madison's and Rutledge's
49. Id. at 559. Mr. Wilson had originally sought a ratification requirement of "two-
thirds." The motion failed, 5 - 6. Id. at 558. It might be wondered why a simple majority was
not considered sufficient for amending the Constitution. After all, the doctrine of popular
sovereignty accepted the principle of "majority rule." See MORGAN, supra note 6, at 142-
43; Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, reprinted in The Portable Thomas
Jefferson 23, 171 (Merrill Peterson ed., 1975) ("Lex majoris partis [is] founded in common
law as well as common right. It is the natural law of every assembly of men .... "). See also
Akhil R. Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Anending The Constitution Outside Article V. 55
U. Chi. L. Rev. 1043, 1060 (1988) (arguing that the principles of popular sovereignty
enshrined in the Constitution would allow ratification by simple majority). But see David
Dow, When Words Mean What We Believe They Say: The Case of Article V, 76 Iowa L. Rev.
I (1990) (disagreeing with Amar that the Constitution can be amended by majority vote).
The problem was a union of States with different sized populations. This created the possi-
bility of amendment outcomes being controlled by a simple majority of states within which
might reside only a minority of the total population. "If the States were of equal size and
importance, a majority of the Legislatures might be sufficient for the grant of any new pow-
ers; but disproportioned as they are and must continue for a time; a larger number may now
in prudence be required." Charles Pinckney, Observations on the Plan of Government, 1787.
reprinted in 4 Founders' Constitution, supra note 18, at 578.
50. 11 FARRAND, supra note 9, at 559. This tracked the arrangement in the Articles of
Confederation, with the significant addition of the option to ratify by state Convention: See
supra note 23 and accompanying text. Madison thus sought congressional monopoly of the
proposing mechanism. His proposal also removed the provision for a national convention.
51. 11 FARRAND, supra note 9, at 559. The clause Rutledge was working so hard to pro-
tect was Sec. 2 of Article IV which provided that "no person held to service or labor in one
State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or reg-
ulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor, but shall be delivered up on claim
of the party to whom such service or labor may be due." Under the authority of this clause,
Congress passed the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 28
(1883) (Harlan, J. dissenting). The reasons for the provision, as well as Southern expecta-
tions regarding it, were elaborated on by James Iredell in the North Carolina Ratifying
Convention:
A compromise likewise took place in regard to the importation of slaves. It is probable
that all the members reprobated this inhuman traffic; but those of South Carolina and
Georgia would not consent to an immediate prohibition of it-one reason of which was, that,
during the last war, they lost a vast number of negroes, which loss they wish to supply.
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proposals. 52
Madison's substitute amendment provision was retained in the sec-
ond major draft of the Constitution reported to the Convention by the
Committee of Style and Arrangement on September 12.53 On September
15, what was now known as Article V read as follows:
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem necessary, or on
the application of two thirds of the Legislatures of the several States shall pro-
pose amendments to this Constitution, which shall be valid to all intents and pur-
poses as part thereof, when the same shall have been ratified by three fourths at
least of the Legislatures of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths
thereof, as one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the
Congress: Provided that no amendment which may be made prior to the year
1808 shall in any manner affect the I & 4 clauses in the 9 section of article 1.54
Sherman "expressed his fears that three fourths of the States might be
brought to do things fatal to particular States, as abolishing them altogeth-
er or depriving them of their equality in the Senate." 55 Accordingly, he
moved that "no State should be affected in its internal police, or deprived
of its equality in the Senate." 56
George Mason stated he believed "the plan of amending the
Constitution exceptionable & dangerous. As the proposing of amend-
ments is in both the modes to depend, in the first immediately, and in the
second, ultimately, on Congress, no amendments of the proper kind would
ever be obtained by the people, if the Government should become oppres-
sive, as he verily believed would be the case." 57 Responding to Mason's
concern, Gouverneur Morris and Elbridge Gerry moved to amend the arti-
James Iredell, Debate in North Carolina Ratifying Convention (29 July 1788), reprinted in 4
ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 7, at 178. According to George Mason, the slavery clause
was the result of a last minute coalition in which the two
Southernmost states .. struck up a bargain with the 3. N. Engld. states, if they would join
to admit slaves for some years, the two Southernmost states would join in changing the
clause which required 2/3 of the legislature in any vote... [Ulnder this coalition the great
principles of the Constn were changed in the last days of the Convention.
George Mason, George Mason's Account of Certain Proceedings in Convention, reprinted
in II FARRAND, supra note 9, at 367.
52. 11 FARRAND, supra note 9, at 559.
53. Id. at 602.
54. Id. at 629.
55. Id.
56. Id. The State suffrage clause was extremely important to the smaller states. Delegates
from Delaware, for example, were prohibited from assenting to any proposal unless equal
state suffrage in Congress was preserved. See CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 100. See also III
FARRAND, supra note 9, at 400 (remarks of Jonathan Dayton in the United States Senate,
November 24, 1803) ("The States, whatever was their relative magnitude, were equal under
the old Confederation, and the small States gave up a part of their rights as a compromise for
a better form of government and security; but they cautiously preserved their equal rights in
the Senate and in the choice of a Chief Magistrate.").
57. 11 FARRAND. supra note 9, at 629 n. 8. In the margin of his copy of the draft of
Sept. 12, Mason had written: "Article 5th - By this article Congress only have the power of
proposing amendments at any future time to this constitution and should it prove ever so
oppressive, the whole people of America can't make, or even propose alterations to it; a
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cle and require a convention upon application of two-thirds of the
States. 58 Madison did not see why "Congress would not be as much
bound to propose amendments applied for by two-thirds of the States as to
call a Convention on the like application. He saw no objection however
against providing for a Convention for the purpose of amendments, except
only that difficulties might arise as to the form, the quorum &c. which in
Constitutional regulations ought to be as much as possible avoided." 59
The motion passed without objection.60
Now a series of final attempts to change the text of the Article was
started. Sherman moved to strike out the words "of three-fourths" after
the words "legislatures" and "Conventions." 6 1 This would "leave[] future
conventions to act in this matter, like the present Conventions according
to circumstances." 62 The motion fell, 3-7.63 Gerry made an unsuccessful
doctrine utterly subversive of the fundamental principles of the rights and liberties of the
people." Id. at 629 n. 8. Mason apparently did not believe Congress would be obliged to pro-
pose amendments applied for by the states. His concern reflects the struggle over what body
would be given the responsibility for proposing amendments. To Mason, a source indepen-
dent of Congress was necessary for "amendments of the proper kind." Id. Russell Caplan has
described the eventual divided proposal power as the "essential compromise of Article V,"
for determining who could propose amendments went a long way towards determining what
kind of amendments would be adopted. CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 29.
58. 11 FARRAND, supra note 9, at 629. The provision for a national convention may
have been modeled after article 63 of the Georgia Constitution of 1777 which stated:
No alteration shall be made in this constitution without petitions from a maiority of coun-
ties, and the petition from each county to be signed by a majority of voters, in each county
within this State; at which time the assembly shall order a convention to be called for that
purose, specifying the alterations to be made, according to the petitions preferred to the
assembly by the majority of the counties as aforesaid.
See CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 15.
59. 11 FARRAND, supra note 9, at 629-30.
60. Id.
61. Id. Thus removing any specified numerical requirement for ratification.
62. Id. At first glance, Sherman's proposal seems strikingly inconsistent with his motion
on September 10 that "no amendment will be binding until consented to by the several
States," see supra note 48, as well as with his concern expressed earlier in the day that the
three-fourths ratification requirement inadequately protected state sovereignty. Supra note
55. If future conventions can act "according to circumstances," then circumstances might
call for ratification by two thirds, or a mere majority, of the states-propositions Sherman
clearly opposed. Sherman's proposals can be reconciled if the present motion is seen as a
back-door attempt to restore the Articles' unanimity requirement. Sherman probably
believed that, in the absence of any explicit requirement, the Articles would apply by
default. State sovereignty would dictate that every state must consent to future amend-
ments-indeed, the idea that fundamental constitutional change could occur without the
unanimous consent of the states was seen by the Antifederalists as an assault on an essential
principle of the American union: equality of the states. I The Complete Anti-Federalist 12-
13 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (hereinafter cited as "STORING"). This interpretation is
further supported by the provision Sherman is seeking to remove: On September 10,
Sherman moved to add the words "but no amendment will he binding until consented to by
the several States." See supra at note 49 and accompanying text. It was this motion that
received the immediate, and successful, insertion of "three-fourths of' before "the several
States" by Mr. Wilson-the very addition Mr. Sherman is now seeking to delete.
63. I1 FARRAND, supra note 9, at 630.
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motion (failing 1-10) to strike out the words "or by Conventions in three-
fourths thereof."64 Sherman repeated his motion "that no State shall with-
out its consent be affected in its internal police, or deprived of equal suf-
frage in the Senate." 65 The motion failed, .3-8.66 In an apparent act of
protest, Sherman then moved to strike out Article V altogether; this
motion also failed 2-8, with one abstention. 67 Finally, in deference to the
"circulating murmurs of the small States," Morris moved to pass on the
second half of Sherman's proposal, "that no State, without its consent
shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate." 68 This motion "was
agreed to without debate,"69 and Article V assumed its final form:
The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall
propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the
Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for
proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and
Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three-
fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three-fourths thereof, as one or
the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by Congress; Provided that no
Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred
and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth
Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be
deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.70
64. Id.
65. Id. Prompting Mr. Madison to remark "Begin with these special provisos, and every
State will insist on them, for their boundaries, exports, &c." Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 630-31.
68. Id at 63 1. Recall that, for some states, equal suffrage in the new Congress was a pre-
condition for ratification. See CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 100.
69. II FARRAND, supra note 9, at 631.
70. Id. at 663. Interestingly, where the rest of the Constitution divides power both hori-
zontally (between the three departments of government) and vertically (between the states
the federal government), Article V involves only a vertical division: only Congress is explic-
itly mentioned as playing a role in the amendment process. One explanation lies in the lin-
gering resentment over the role these respective departments played prior to the revolution.
According to James Wilson:
[In the recent past, executive and judicial powers] were derived from a different and for-
eign source: they were regulated by foreign maxims: they were directed to foreign purposes.
Need we be surprised, that they were objects of aversion and distrust? Need we be surprised,
that every occasion was seized for lessening their influence, and weakening their energy? On
the other hand, our assemblies were chosen by ourselves: they were the guardians of our
rights, the objects of our confidence, and the anchor of our political hopes. Every power,
which could be placed in them, was thought to be safely placed: every extension of power
was considered an extension of our own security.
James Wilson, Lectures on Law, 1790-1791, in The Works of James Wilson 292-93 (Robert
Green McClosky ed., Belknap 1967). The Founders anticipated the executive to have a gen-
erally limited role in governing the nation. See generally James W. Ceaser, Presidential
Selection: Theory and Development 52-64 (Princeton, 1979) (discussing Founders' anxieties
about "popular leadership"). See also Hollingsworth v. Virginia, U.S. (3 Dall.) 378, 381 n.*
(1798) (Chase, J.) ("[tihe negative of the President applies only to the ordinary cases of leg-
islation: He has nothing to do with the proposition, or adoption, of amendments to the
Constitution."). But see, Bruce Ackerman, Tranformnative Appointments, 101 Harv. L. Rev.
1164, 1171 (noting that the "assembly-led" classical system has been replaced by the presi-
dentially-led system of the twentieth century) (hereinafter cited as "ACKERMAN").
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Reaction to Article V: Defense and Invocation
A. The Federalists and Article V
"Look through the Constitution from beginning to end, and you will
not find an article which is not founded on the presumption of a clashing
of interests." 71 This is especially true for Article V. The text was a com-
promise between those who favored Congress as the proposing institution
and those who feared that congressional monopoly of the proposing
mechanism would prevent" ("amendments of the proper kind.")72 In their
defense of the proposed Constitution, however, the Federalists made a
virtue out of this necessary compromise and pointed to Article V as proof
of a balanced constitution-one "neither wholly national nor wholly
federal." 73
The decision to exclude the Judiciary was not as much of a foregone conclusion as it was
with the Executive. Proposals were advanced at Philadelphia that would have given the
Judiciary a role in amending the constitution:
To assist the President in conducting the Public affairs there shall be a Council of State
composed of the following officers-I. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who shall
from time to time recommend such alterations of and additions to the laws of the U.S. as may
in his opinion be necessary to the due administration of Justice, and such as may promote
useful learning and inculcate sound morality throughout the Union.
11 FARRAND, supra note 9, at 342. Even though the proposal was ultimately rejected-thus
excluding the Judiciary from any role in generating the text-the Judiciary was not prevent-
ed from reviewing whether proper procedures had been followed in the adoption of an
amendment. In fact, some members of the Philadelphia Convention expected judicial
review. 11 FARRAND, supra note 9, at 92 (remarks of Gouverneur Morris) ("If the
Confederation is to be pursued no alteration can be made without the unanimous consent of
the Legislatures: Legislative alterations not conformable to the federal compact, would
clearly not be valid. The Judges would consider them as null & void."). See also CAPLAN,
supra note 2, at 130. Judicial review of the amendment process became a fact within the first
decade after ratification. In Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 378 (1798), the
Supreme Court held the Eleventh Amendment had been constitutionally adopted and reject-
ed the claim that the Amendment had "not been proposed in the form prescribed by the
Constitution," Id. at 381. Although the Court in Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939),
held that issues surrounding the ratification process are generally nonjusticiable, the histori-
cal evidence seems to refute that holding. See also CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 129; Amar,
supra note 50, at 1046 n.3.
71. 13 Annals of Congress 101 (1803) (remarks of Senator Dayton).
72. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
73. The Federalist No. 39 (James Madison), supra note 8, at 246. See also The Federalist
No. 43 (James Madison), supra note 8, at 278-79 ("[Article V] equally enables the general
and the State goverments to originate the amendment of errors, as they may be pointed out
by the experience on one side, or one the other."). The Antifederalists claimed that the new
Constitution violated State Sovereignty and amounted to "consolidation" of the states. In
response, the Federalists, pointed out that since two thirds of the states can propose, and
three fourths of the states can "accomplish alterations" to the govemment, "consolidation"
was neither intended nor possible under the proposed Constitution. See A Freeman II,
Pennsylvania Gazette, January 30, 1788, reprinted in XV The Documentary History of the
Ratification of the Constitution: Commentaries on the Constitution 511 (John P. Kaminski &
Gaspare J. Saldino eds., 1981) (hereinafter "COMMENTARIES").
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The multi-layered structure of the amendment assailed by the
Antifederalists as hopelessly complicated, 74 was portrayed as a structural
safeguard "against that extreme facility, which would render the
Constitution too mutable; 75 and that extreme difficulty, which might per-
petuate its faults."76 In response to claims that Article V's procedures
were prohibitively difficult, the Federalist invoked the spirit of the
Revolution:
That [the Constitution] may be improved, is not to be doubted, and provision is
made for that purpose, in the report itself. A people who could conceive, and can
adopt it, we need not fear will be able to amend it, when by experience its incon-
veniences and imperfections shall be seen and felt.... [W]e may safely appeal to
the history of this country as proof, in the last twenty years. We have united
against the British; we have united in calling the late federal Convention; and we
may certainly unite again in such alterations as in reason shall appear to be
important for the peace and happiness of America.77
Moreover, there was hopeful anticipation that the conventions of the
future would be much simpler affairs than the recent one in Philadelphia,
as they would have "[n]o experiments to devise; the general and funda-
mental regulations already laid down." 78
Article V was of particular comfort to those who believed the pro-
posed Constitution was flawed, and yet felt amendments should wait until
after ratification. 79 The need was to create the best form of national gov-
74. See infa note 116 and accompanying text.
75. See The Federalist No. 49 (James Madison), supra note 8, at 313 (discussing the dan-
gers of making the amendment process too frequent an occurrence).
76. The Federalist No. 43 (James Madison), supra note 8 at 278-79. Later commentators
would point out the advantage of Article V's "convoluted" nature. See St. George Tucker,
Blackstone's Commentaries 371-72 (1803), reprinted in 4 Founders' Constitution, supra
note 18, at 583 ("[Tlhe mode both of originating and of ratifying amendments, in either
mode which the constitution directs, must necessarily be attended with such obstacles, and
delays, as must prove a sufficient bar against light, or frequent innovations."). Justice Story
saw the article's built-in temporal delays as providing "ample time, for deliberation, both in
proposing and ratifying amendments. They cannot be carried by surprise, or intrigue, or arti-
fice. Indeed, years may elapse before a deliberate judgment may be passed upon them,
unless some pressing emergency calls for instant action." Joseph Story, 3 Commentaries on
the Constitution §§ 1821-24 (1833), reprinted in 4 Founders' Constitution. supra note 18, at
584.
77. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 7, at 117 (remarks of Dr. Charles Jarvis,
Massachusetts Ratifying Convention).
78. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 7, at 102 (remarks of Wilson Nicholas, Debates
in the Virginia Ratifying Convention, June 16, 1788). Nicholas believed future conventions
would "have their deliberations confined to a few points; no local interest to divert their
attention; nothing but the necessary alterations." Id.
79. John Adams, for instance, despite his belief that the Constitution dangerously mixed
legislative and executive power in the Senate, still thought "the People had better adopt it as
it is-and then appoint a new Convention to make such alterations as may prove necessary."
Abigail Adams Smith to John Quincy Adams (London, February 10, 1788), reprinted in
COMMENTARIES (2), supra note 82, at 502; John Adams to Cotton Tufts (London,
January 23, 1788), reprinted in COMMENTARIES (2), siqra note 73, at 499. See also
Pastor John Craighead to John Nicholson (Rocky Springs, Pa., February 9, 1788), reprinted
in COMMENTARIES (4), supra note 73, at 95 ("Sincerely deslire?j to see it amended, if
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emnment that could be agreed to at this time-any imperfections could be
worked out at some future date. 80 After all, the "seeds of reformation
[were] sown within the work itself," 81 where there was an "easy and
constitutional method" of amendment "should it be found faulty in any
particular." 82
Finally, to the notion that the Constitution could always be easily
amended in the future, the Federalists added a sense of emergency. A
national government was necessary "to rescue our dear country from that
national dishonor, injustice, anarchy, confusion and bloodshed."83
Washington believed that "the political concerns of this country are, in a
manner, suspended by a thread ... if nothing had been agreed to by [the
Convention], anarchy would soon have ensued-the seeds being richly
adopted. But whether it be safe [to?I attempt it now in our disunited, mouldering state or
immediately or as soon as possible after adoption of the general plan, in the mode pointed
out by ye convention, I leave to politicians to determine."); 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra
note 7, at 117 (remarks of Dr. Charles Jarvis, Massachusetts Ratifying Convention) ("I shall
not sit down, sir, without repeating, that, as it is clearly more difficult for twelve states to
agree to another convention, than for nine to unite in favor of amendments, so it is certainly
better to receive the present Constitution, in the hope of its being amended, than it would be
to reject it altogether.").
80. Typical of this point of view are the remarks of George Washington:
I wish the Constitution which is offered had been made more perfect, but I sincerely
believe it is the best that could be obtained at this time-and as a constitutional door is opened
for amendment hereafter, the adoption of it under present circumstances of the Union is in
my opinion desirable.
George Washington to Former Virginia Governors, Sept. 24, 1787, reprinted in
COMMENTARIES (I), supra note 73, at 224. See also The Federalist No. 38, supra note 8
at 237 "it is a matter both of wonder and regret that those who raise so many objections
against the new Constitution should never call to mind the defects of that which is to be
exchanged for it. It is not necessary that the former should be perfect: it is sufficient that the
latter is more imperfect.").
81. James Wilson, Speech at a Public Meeting itt Philadelphia, Oct. 6, 1787, reprinted in
Commentaries (I ), supra note 82, at 337.
82. Federal Constitution, Pennsylvania Gazette, October 10, 1887, reprinted in
COMMENTARIES (I), supra note 73, at 364. See also John Jay to John Adams, October
16, 1787, reprinted int Commentaries (1), supora note 73 at 385 ("For my part I think Ithe
Constitutioni much better than the one we have, and therefore that we shall be the Gainers
by the Exchange; especially as there is reason to hope that Experience and the Good sense of
the People, will correct what may prove to be inexpedient in it."). According to Justice
Story, Article Five was a "safety valve to let off all temporary effervescences and excite-
ments; and the real effective instrument to control and adjust the movements of the machin-
cry, when out of order, or in danger of self-destruction." "A government, which, in its own
organization, provides no means of change, but assumes to be fixed and unalterable, must,
after a while, become wholly unsuited to the circumstances of the nation .... [The framers]
desired, that [the Constitutioni might be open to improvement; and under the guidance of the
sober judgment and enlightened skill of the country, to be perpetually approaching nearer
and nearer to perfection." Joseph Story, 3 Commentaries on the Constitution §§ 1821-24
(1833), reprinted in 4 Founders' Constitution, stpra note I 8, at 584.
83. Meeting of Philadelphia Association of Baptist Churches (New York Packet, October
12, 1787), reprinted in COMMENTARIES (I), supra note 73, at 375.
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sown in every soil."84 Federalist writers saw "confusion and distresses"
throughout the country and challenged their readers to "[v]iew these
things ... and then say that we do not require a new, a protecting, and effi-
cient federal government, if you can." 85
B. Article V in the State Ratification Conventions
Article V aroused little controversy in the state ratification conven-
tions. If discussed at all, 86 the Article was most often cited as proof that
the people retained the right to amend the proposed Constitution if experi-
ence proved it necessary. 87 In Massachusetts, for instance, Federalists
claimed Article V provided "the people ... an opportunity to correct any
abuse which might take place in the future administration of the govern-
ment under it."88 Refuting the claim that it would be impossible to get the
requisite number of states to agree to amendments after ratification, 89 the
Federalists recalled the spirit of unanimity that prevailed during the
Revolution and declared "we may certainly unite again in such alterations
as in reason shall appear to be important for the peace and happiness of
84. George Washington to Former Virginia Governors, September 24, 1787, reprinted in
COMMENTARIES (1), supra note 73, at 224.
85. The Federal Constitution,. Pennsylvania Gazette (October 10, 1787), reprinted in
COMMENTARIES (1), supra note 73, at 365.
86. There is no record of discussions regarding Article V in the state ratification conven-
tions of Delaware, New Jersey, Georgia. Maryland, or New Hampshire. See generally The
Bill of Rights: A Documentary History (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1971) (hereinafter
"SCHWARTZ").
87. In Pennsylvania, Thomas M'Kean agreed with his colleague, James Wilson, that the
people had the right at any time to "alter and abolish their government," and he was "happy
to observe, that the Constitution . . . provides a regular mode for that event." 2
SCHWARTZ, supra note 86, at 643-44. Speaking before the North Carolina assembly,
James Iredell declared his belief that Article V allowed the Constitution to be "altered with
as much regularity, and as little confusion, as any act of Assembly; not, indeed, quite so eas-
ily, which would be extremely impolitic; but it is a most happy circumstance, that there is a
remedy in the system itself for its own fallibility, so that alterations can without difficulty be
made, agreeable to the general sense of the people." 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 7,
at 177. Rejecting the contention that amendments "depended altogether on Congress," Id. at
178, Iredell pointed out that "the legislatures of two thirds of the states were authorized to
make application for calling a convention to propose amendments, and, on such application,
it is provided that Congress shall call such convention, so that they have no option." Id. at
178 (emphasis in original). In the Connecticut convention, Richard Law remarked that
"[tlhere is one clause in [the Constitution] which provides a remedy for whatever defects it
may have .... [The Article provides] an easy and peaceable way of amending any parts of
the Constitution which may be found inconvenient in practice." 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES,
supra note 7 at 200.
88. 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 7, at 116 (remarks of Rufus King).
89. For example, Samuel Adams had his doubts about waiting until after ratification to
propose amendments. "Suppose, sir, nine states accept the Constitution without any condi-
tions at all, and the four states should wish to have amendments, -where will you firid nine-
states to propose, and the legislatures of nine states to agree to, the introduction of amend-
ments?" Id. at 124. Adams believed amendments would have a better chance if ratification
was made conditional on their acceptance. Id. at 124-25.
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America." 90 In fact, even those states which believed the proposed
Constitution was flawed, nevertheless, invoked Article V as the proper
vehicle for obtaining amendments. 9 1
The Virginia convention provides the sole recorded instance of sus-
tained discussion regarding Article V. Speaking in support of the pro-
posed Constitution, Edmund Pendleton described the Article as providing
"an easy and quiet method of reforming what may be amiss." 92 Pendleton
dismissed the possibility that a future recalcitrant Congress would refuse
to allow needed amendments, for if Congress refused to act "[w]ho shall
dare to resist the people? No, we will assemble in Convention; wholly
recall our delegated powers, or reform them so as to prevent such abuse;
and punish those servants who have perverted powers, designed for our
happiness, to their own emolument." 93
The Antifederalists were not convinced. Patrick Henry declared the
way to amendment was "shut." 94 Because "[t]wo-thirds of the Congress,
or of the state legislatures, are necessary even to propose amendments,
[I]f one-third of these be unworthy men, they may prevent the application
for amendments." 95 Moreover, requiring three-fourths of the states to con-
cur for ratification "is to suppose that they will possess genius, intelli-
gence, and integrity, approaching to miraculous." 96 Since a bare majority
in four of the smallest states could hinder the adoption of amendments,
''we may fairly and justly conclude that one twentieth part of the
American people may prevent the removal of the most grievous inconve-
niences and oppression." 97 Lee also rejected Pendleton's argument that,
should the government become oppressive, a convention could easily be
90. Id. at 147 (remarks of Dr. Charles Jarvis).
91. After voting to ratify the Constitution, Massachusetts proposed amendments which
were to be obtained "agreeably to the 5th article of the said Constitution, to exert all their
influence, and use all reasonable and legal methods, to obtain a ratification of the said alter-
atons and provisions, in such manner as is provided in the said article." 2 ELLIOT'S
DEBATES, supra note 7, at 178. New Hampshire also proposed amendments to be
"Considered agreeably to the fifth Article of the said Constitution" and requested their repre-
sentatives "to exert their Influence & use all reasonable & Legal methods to obtain a ratifica-
tion of the said alterations and Provisions, in such a manner as provided in the said article."
2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 86, at 761. New York also directed their Representatives to "use
all reasonable means to Obtain a Ratification of the following Amendments to the
Constitution in the manner prescribed therein." Id. at 915.
92. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 7, at 37.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 49.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id at 50. Henry noted that the Virginia bill of rights guaranteed to "the majority of the
community ... an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to reform, alter, or abolish
[the govemment], in such manner as shall be judged most conducive to the public weal," and
declared Article V violated "the language of democracy." Id. See also id. at 55 (Henry point-
ing out that, even were Virginia to be unanimous in its desire to amend the Constitution, "yet
they may be prevented therefrom by a despicable minority at the extremity of the United
States").
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called and delegated powers revoked. "Did you ever read of any revolu-
tion in a nation, brought about by the punishment of those in power,
inflicted by those who had no power at all? You read of a riot act in a
country which is called one of the freest in the world, where a few neigh-
bors cannot assemble without the risk of being shot by a hired soldiery,
the engines of despotism. We may see such an act in America." 98
Madison defended Article V's numerical requirements by pointing
out that, under the Articles of Confederation, the decision to amend must
be unanimous. 99 Repeating the argument he made in Philadelphia,
Madison reminded the convention of the numerous times proposed
amendments to the Articles were defeated by "the smallest state in the
Union" and asked "[w]ould the honorable gentleman agree to continue the
most radical defects in the old system, because the petty state of Rhode
Island would not agree to remove them?" 00 In response to Lee's predic-
tion of a recalcitrant Congress, George Nicholas conceded that, had
Article V granted Congress a monopoly over proposing amendments,
"there might have been danger." However, in this case, "[t]he committee
will see that there is another mode provided, besides that which originates
with Congress."Ol Moreover, one could expect future conventions to be
rather limited affairs.
"[They] will have their deliberations confined to a few points; no
local interest to divert their attention; nothing but the necessary alter-
ations .... No experiments to devise; the general and fundamental regula-
tions being already laid down."10 2 Virginia ultimately ratified the
Constitution and along with its notice of ratification sent to Congress a list
of amendments to be passed "in the manner provided by the 5th article of
the said Constitution."1 03
Considering the state convention commentary on Article V as a
whole, it is revealing that Article V was both attacked and defended on
the grounds of popular sovereignty. The Antifederalists attacked the
Article as an affront to the "language of democracy" which recognizes the
people's right to "alter or abolish" their syslem of government. 104 The
Federalists responded by pointing out that the Article explicitly guaran-
98. Id. at 51.
99. Id. at 88.
100. Id. at 89.
101. Id. at 101.
102. Id. at 102. It is not clear whether Nicholas was expressing his hope, or whether he
believed conventions under Article V could be limited. Although raising an important issue,
the question of whether a national convention can be limited in its deliberations is beyond
the limited scope of this Article.
103. Id. at 661. The proposed additions included "Itihat the people have a right peaceably
to assemble together to consult for the common good, or to instruct their representatives; and
that every freeman has a right to petition or apply to the legislature for redress of griev-
ances." 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 86, at 842. Madison used Virginia's proposed amend-
ments as a model for the Bill of Rights he presented to the first Congress. See id at 765.
104. 3 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 7, at 50 (remarks of Mr. Henry).
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teed the right of the people to "assemble in convention."105 A number of
states were apparently unconvinced and called for more explicit amend-
ments protecting principles of popular sovereignty. 106 Madison himself
proposed amendments to the Constitution which would protect the
People's right to "alter or abolish" their Constitution,107 and the right to
"peaceably assemble."1 08 However, even if these proposals suggest that
many believed the Constitution should explicitly recognize and protect the
sovereignty of the people, Article V itself was remarkably uncontrover-
sial. Of the many proposed amendments to the new Constitution, none
sought to change the proposed "constitutional road to the decision of the
people." In fact, to the dismay of the Federalists, the Antifederalists
engaged in a campaign to convince the people to walk this road as soon as
possible.
105. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (remarks of Mr. Pendleton).
106. Among the amendments considered by the Maryland convention was one asserting
that "whenever the ends of government are perverted, and the public liberty manifestly
endangered, and all other means of redress are ineffectual, the people may, and of right
ought to, reform the old, or establish a new government." 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 86, at
735. Although not officially adopted, the amendments proposed in the Maryland convention
were circulated by the minority in pamphlet form and may have influenced the amendments
later recommended by Virginia, upon which Madison drew in writing his draft of the Bill of
Rights. Id. at 729. Virginia's recommendations included a declaration that "all power is nat-
urally invested in, and consequently derived from, the people," and that "the people have a
right peaceably to assemble together to consult for the common good, or to instruct their rep-
resentatives; and that every freeman has a right to petition or apply to the legislature for
redress of grievances." Id. at 840-842. New York also proposed a declaration explicitly rec-
ognizing that "all power is originally invested in, and consequently derived from, the peo-
ple," and the people's "right peaceably to assemble together to consult for their common
good." Id. at 911,913. North Carolina followed suit and sought a declaration that "all power
is naturally vested in, and consequently derived from, the people; that magistrates, therefore,
are their trustees and agents, and at all times amenable to them," Id. at 966, and that "the
people have a right peaceably to assemble together, to consult for the common good, or to
instruct their representatives; and that every freeman has a right to petition or apply to the
legislature for redress of grievances." Id. at 968. See also 2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra
note 7, at 434-35 (James Wilson's remarks at the opening of the Pennsylvania ratification
convention) ("We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union,
establish justice, &c.. do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of
America.' It is announced in their name-it receives its political existence from their author-
ity: they ordain and establish. What is the necessary consequence? Those who ordain and
establish have the power, if they think proper, to repeal and annul.") (emphasis in original).
107. Madison's proposed Preamble read: "Tha the people have an indubitable, unalien-
able, and indefensible right to reform or change their Government, whenever it be found
adverse or inadequate to the purposes of its institution." 2 SCHWARTZ, suqnra note 86, at
1026. The proposal was opposed on the grounds that the words in the current preamble
"speak as much as it is possible to speak; it is a practical recognition of the tight of the peo-
ple to ordain and establish Governments, and is more expressive than any other mere paper
declaration." Id. at 1072 (remarks of Rep. Jackson of Georgia). See Amar, supra note 50, at
1057 (citing Madison's proposals as evidence for the non-exclusivity of Article V). But see
John Vile, Legally v Anlending the United States Constitution: Tie Extlusivity' of Article V's
Mechanisms. 21 Cumb. L. Rev. 271 (1990-1991).
108. See 5 The Founders' Constitution, supra note 18, at 25 ("The people shall not be
restrained from peaceably assembling and consulting for their common good.").
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C. The Antifederalists and the Second Convention Movement
Ye patriots! ye lovers of peace, of liberty, and of your fellow men! ye are called
upon at this solemn juncture, to stand forth and save your country; before the
breach is too wide, and while the parties may still be reconciled to each other;
before anarchy stalks through the land; and before the sword of civil discord is
unsheathed. For the sake of every thing that is great and good, and as you shall
answer for it at the great tribunal, use your influence to procure another general
convention with all possible speed, as the only way left to preserve the union of
America, and to save your fellow citizens from misery and destruction. 109
The call for a second convention came even before the assembly in
Philadelphia adjourned. On August 31, 1787, George Mason declared that
"he would sooner chop off his right hand than put it to the Constitution as
it now stands." 10 If certain changes were not made, "his wish would then
be to bring the whole subject before another general Convention." 1 I
Gouverneur Morris and Edmund Randolph echoed Mason's concerns,
with Randolph proposing that the State ratifying conventions "be at liber-
ty to propose amendments to be submitted to another General Convention
which may reject or incorporate them, as shall be judged proper."112
On September 10, Randolph again stated his objections to the
Constitution as it now stood and proposed "that the State Conventions
shd. be at liberty to offer amendments to the plan - and that these should
109. Philadelphiensis (IX), Philadelphia Freemen's Journal (February 6, 1788), reprinted
in COMMENTARIES (4), supra note 73, at 60. Calls for a second convention are ubiquitous
in Antifederalist writings. See Richard Henry Lee to Governor Edmund Randolph
(December 22, 1787), Virginia Gazette reprinted in 5 STORING, supra note 63, at 116
("[U]pon the whole, sir, my opinion is, that as this constitution abounds with useful regula-
tions, at the same time that it is liable to strong and fundamental objections, the plan for us
to pursue, will be to propose the necessary amendment, and express our willingness to adopt
it with the amendments, and to suggest the calling of a new convention for the purpose of
considering them. To this I see no well founded objection, but great safety and much good to
be the probable result."). See also Letters of Centinel Vii, (Philadelphia) Independent
Gazetteer (December 27, 1787) reprinted in 2 STORING, supra note 63, at 175; Reply to
Medium by a Citizen, New York Journal (November 24, 1787), reprinted in 6 STORING,
supra note 63, at 47; Essay by a Farmer, (New Hampshire) Freeman's Oracle and New
Hampshire Advertiser (January 11, 1788), reprinted in 4 STORING, supra note 63, at 209;
Essays of Philadelphienvis (IX, X), (Philadelphia) Independent Gazetteer (November 1787 -
April 1788), reprinted in 3 STORING, supra note 63, at 129, 133; A Federal Republican, A
Review of the Constitution (November 28, 1787), reprinted in COMMENTARIES (2), supra
note 82, at 276; The Letters of Agrippa (iI), Massachusetts Gazette (November 30, 1787),
reprintrd in, 4 STORING, supra note 63, at 75.
Interestingly, a controversy mirroring the calls for a second national convention had
played out earlier at the state level when Pennsylvania adopted its constitution in 1776.
WOOD, supra note 3, at 438. Pressuring the legislature to call a new convention, the
Republicans derided the reluctance of the Constitutionalists: .... [Y]ou are afraid to trust
the people with their own power .... The people (you seem to say by your conduct) are
such a set of stupid creatures, that they will chuse improper men to make a constitution for
them." Pennsylvania Journal (Philadelphia, June 23, 1784), cited in WOOD, supra note 3, at
445.
110. II FARRAND, supra note 9, at 479.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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be submitted to a second General Convention, with full power to settle the
Constitution finally."113 The motion was seconded by Benjamin
Franklin. 114 On September 15, Randolph'renewed his motion, this time
stating that should the motion not pass, he would be unable to sign the
proposed Constitution. 115 Mason agreed: "This Constitution had been
formed without the knowledge or idea of the people. A second
Convention will know more of the sense of the people, and be able to pro-
vide a system more consonant to it."] 16 He too could not sign without an
agreement to hold a second convention.117 Charles Pinckney, however,
saw "[n]othing but confusion & contrariety" coming from a second con-
vention. "The States will never agree in their plans-And the Deputies to
a second Convention coming together under the discordant impressions of
their Constituents, will never agree. Conventions are serious things, and
ought not to be repeated."'1 8 Mr. Randolph's motion was unanimously
defeated. 119 On September 28, 1787, Congress transmitted the proposed
Constitution to the states for ratification.
1. The Public Debate
Antifederalists rejected Federalist claims that the union was "sus-
pended by a thread;" instead, they portrayed the country as experiencing
neither "external war, or internal discord" that would "prevent the most
cool, collected, full, and fair discussion of this all-important subject."1 20
Moreover, there was "remarkable uniformity in the objections made to the
constitution, on the most important points."121
113. Id. at 560-61, 564. Note that Randolph apparently assumed the second convention
would have the power to make amendments part of the constitution without subsequent state
ratification.
114. 11 FARRAND, supra note 9, at 564.
115. Id. at 631. See also A Letter His Excellency Edmund Randolph, Esquire, on the
Federal Constitution (Richmond, October 10, 1787), reprinted in 2 STORING, supra note 63.
116. II FARRAND, supra note 9 at 632.
117. Id. See also id. at 633 (remarks of Elbridge Gerry) ("[T]he best that could be done
he conceived was to provide for a second general Convention.").
118. Id. at 632.
119. Id. at 633.
120. Richard Henry Lee to Governor Edmund Randolph, Petersburg Virginia Gazette
(December 6, 1787), reprinted in COMMENTARIES (2), supra note 73, at 367. See also
Luther Martin, Genuine Information III, Baltimore Maryland Gazette (January 4, 1788),
reprinted in COMMENTARIES (3), supra note 73, at 252.
121. Address by a Plebeian (New York, 1788), reprinted in 6 STORING, supra note 63, at
136. See also Centinel IV, Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer (November 30, 1787), reprint-
ed in COMMENTARIES (2), supra note 73, at 323 ("[T]here never was such a coincidence on
any occasion as on the present, the opponents of the proposed plan, at the same time in every
part of the continent, harmonised in the same objections; such an uniformity of opposition is
without example and affords the strongest demonstration of its solidity."); The Pennsylvania
Herald (December 26, 1787), reprinted in COMMENTARIES (3), supra note 73, at 110 (not-
ing the "unanimous opinion of the states, respecting the alterations that ought to be made").
Plebeian emphasized the interstate nature of the objections to the proposed constitution and
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Antifederalist publications exhorted the people to take advantage of
the relative ease with which a new convention could be called. After all,
the same power that called the last convention could call another.122
"Only a few months will be necessary for this purpose; if we consider the
magnitude of the object, we shall deem it well worth a little time and
attention .... "123 In his letter to wavering Virginia Governor Edmund
Randolph, Richard Henry Lee noted "[e]xperience and the actual state of
things, show there is no difficulty in procuring a general convention; the
late one being collected without any obstruction .... If with infinite ease,
a convention was obtained to prepare a system, why may not another with
equal ease be procured to make proper and necessary amendments? Good
government is not the work of a short time, or of sudden thought."'124
Not only would a new convention be just as easily obtained as the
last, the next would have an advantage: delegates informed by the consid-
ered judgment of the people. The debates of the last convention "were
kept an impenetrable secret, and no opportunity was given for well
informed men to offer their sentiments upon the subject."' 25 Since that
[time], however," [the Constitution] has been the object of universal
attention-it has been thought of by every reflecting man-been dis-
cussed in a public and private manner, in conversation and in print; its
defects have been pointed out, and every objection to it stated."t 26
downplayed the existence of more parochial concerns. See Address by a Plebeian (New
York, 1788), reprinted in 6 STORING, supra note 63, at 136 ("It is also worthy of notice,
that very few of the matters found fault within it, are of a local nature, or such as affect any
particular state; on the contrary, they are such as concern the principles of general liberty, in
which the people of New Hampshire, New York, and Georgia are equally interested.").
122. See Essays of An Old Whig (IV). (Philadelphia) Independent Gazetteer (October
1787 February 1788), reprinted in 3 STORING, supra note 63, at 31. Thomas Jefferson
shared the Antifederalists' faith in the relative ease with which a convention could be con-
vened and accomplish its task. See infra note 207.
123. Id.
124. Richard Henry Lee to Governor Edniund Randolph. Petersburg Virginia Gazette
(December 6, 1787), reprinted in COMMENTARIES (2), supra note 73, at 367. See also
Luther Martin, Gendne Intfrmation Ill, Baltimore Maryland Gazette (January 4, 1788),
reprinted in Commentaries (3), supra note 73, at 251-52.
125. Address by a Plebeian (New York, 1788), reprinted in 6 STORING, supra note 63,
at 136. See also II FARRAND, supra note 9, at 632 (remarks of George Mason) ("This
Constitution had been formed without the knowledge or idea of the people. A second
Convention will know more of the sense of the people, and be able to provide a system more
consonant to it.").
126. Address by a Plebeian (New York, 1788), reprinted in 6 STORING, supra note 63,
at 136. See also Centinel (IV). Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer (November 30, 1787),
reprinted in Commentaries (2), supra note 73, at 323 ("[The Convention was] wholly unin-
formed of the sentiments of their constituents in respect to this form of government, as it was
not in their contemplation when the convention was appointed to erect a new government,
but strengthen the old one .. "): Essays by Candidus (I), (Boston) Independent Chronicle
(December 6, 1787), reprinted in 4 STORING, stpra note 63 at 127 (Should a new conven-
lion be called "It be objections (if any) of the several States would then be fully known, and
after examining the sentiments of the whole, some plan it is probable would be devised, that
would meet the approbation of the confederacy."): Speeches of Rawlins Lowndes in the
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Those who proposed a second convention rejected the idea that
amendments could be secured after the Constitution was formally adopt-
ed; the new (and distant) national government could not be trusted to pro-
pose--or accept-any amendment that would limit its own power:
Every man of reflection must see, that the change now proposed, is a transfer of
power from the many to the few, and the probability is, the artful and ever active
aristocracy, will prevent all peaceable measures for changes, unless when they shall
discover some favorable moment to increase their own influence. I am sensible,
thousands of men in the United States, are disposed to adopt the proposed constitu-
tion, though they perceive it to be essentially defective, under the idea that amend-
ments of it, may be obtained when necessary. This is a pernicious idea .... 127
Little solace was taken in Article V's requirement that Congress call a
convention upon the application of two-thirds of the states. With issues of
national concern delegated to assemblies in Washington, the states them-
selves would be too preoccupied with local matters "to turn their thoughts
to such high subjects." 28
Even absent self-dealing by the national government, the amendment
procedure itself was portrayed as hopelessly convoluted. It was "a
labyrinth," and by the time its intricacies were traced, "ages will revolve,
and perhaps the great principles upon which our late glorious revolution
was founded, will be totally forgotten."129 In the words of one
South Carolina Legislature (January 17, 1788), reprinted in 4 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra
note 7, at 290. ("He ILowndesi recommended that another convention should be called, and
as the general sense of America appeared now to be known, every objection could be met on
fair grounds, and adequate remedies applied where necessary. This mode of proceeding
would conciliate all parties, because it was candid, and had a more obvious tendency to do
away with all inconveniences than the adoption of a government which perhaps might
require the bayonet to enforce it ... ").
In the shadows of this argument lurks the claim that the Philadelphia Convention exceed-
ed its mandate. See, e.g., Luther Martin, Genuine Information (11/), Baltimore Maryland
Gazette (January 4, 1788), reprinted in COMMENTARIES (3), supra note 73, at 252 (stat-
ing his belief that the only reason a new convention might not be obtained was because
"when Ithe States[ discovered the part this convention had acted, and how much its members
were abusing the trust reposed in them, the States would never trust another convention.")
(emphasis in original). No less a figure than George Washington doubted the legality of the
Convention, but nonetheless felt the circumstances warranted going beyond the letter of the
Articles, "otherwise, like a house on fire, whilst the most regular mode of extinguishing it is
contended for, the building is reduced to ashes." George Washington to Henry Knox
(February 3, 1787), cited in CAPLAN, st/pta note 1, at 26.
127. Federal Farmer (IV) (October 12, 1787), reprinted in 4 The Founders' Constitution.
supra note 18, at 579. See also Letters From the Federal Farner (IV) (October 12, 1787),
reprinted in 2 STORING, sqpra note 63, at 250-51 ("[Wlhen power is once transferred from
the many to the few, all changes become extremely difficult .... ); Samuel Chase, Notes of
Speectes Delivered to the Maryland Ratifying Convention. (April 1788), reprinted in 5
STORING, supra note 63, at 88; Essays of[ an Old Whig (I), (Philadelphia) Independent
Gazetteer (October 1787 - February 1788), reprinted in 3 STORING, stpra note 63, at 20;
Lettters ol'a Republican Federalist (IV), Massachusetts Centinel (January 12, 1788), reprint-
ed in 4 STORING, supra note 63, at 177.
128. Essays o1 an old Whig (I), (Philadelphia) Independent Gazetteer (October 1787
February 1788), reprinted in 3 STORING, supra note 63, at 20.
129. An Old Whig (I), Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer (October 12. 1787), reprinted
in COMMENTARIES (1), supra note 73, at 377.
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Antifederalist, Article V required a confluence of circumstances so
unlikely, he "would full as soon sit down and take my chance of winning
an important privilege to the people, by the casting of the dice 'till I could
throw sixes a hundred times in succession." 130
In sum, Antifederalists believed Article V provided no more guaran-
tee of the peoples' right to alter or abolish their constitution than the
"parchment barriers" so derided by the Federalists. 13 1 Neither Congress
nor the States would have an incentive to propose amendments of the
proper kind and, in the unlikely event such proposals were made, the intri-
cacies of the Article would cause such delay that the people themselves
would grow accustomed to the constitutional imperfection. The
Antifederalists argued that if the Constitution required alteration, then the
time to amend was not later, but now. 132
2. The Second Convention Movement in the State Assemblies
As the debate raged outside in pamphlets and newspaper editorials,
state ratifying conventions met to consider whether to adopt the
Constitution as written or to seek pre-ratification amendments by way of a
second convention. Following Randolph's report to the Virginia House of
Delegates,133 George Mason and Patrick Henry introduced resolutions in
the Virginia legislature defraying the expenses of "the deputies to a
Federal Convention in case such a Convention should be judged neces-
sary."' 34 On December 12, 1787, the Virginia legislature passed an act
which reserved funds for the state's ratification convention to hold "com-
munications with any of the sister states" and for "collecting the senti-
ments of the union respecting the proposed federal constitution."135
Randolph, whose enthusiasm for a second convention had apparently
cooled, did not forward the Act to other state governors until December
27;136 Governor George Clinton of New York did not receive his copy
130. An Old Whig (VIII). Philadelphia Independent Gaetteer (February 6, 1788), reprint-
ed in COMMENTARIES (4), supra note 73, at 56.
131. See The Federalist No. 48 (James Madison), supra note 8, at 308. See also Centinel
II, Philadelphia Freeman's Journal (October 24, 1787), reprinted in COMMENTARIES (1),
supra note 73, at 467 (Article is "mere sound").
132. See An Old Whig (VIII), Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer (February 6, 1788),
reprinted in COMMENTARIES (3), supra note 73, at 56 ("Inveterate power is at all limes
very hard to be controuled. Habits, connexions, dependence, and a thousand circumstances
in course of time, rivet the chains of slavery 'till we grow either callous to their galling, or
too feeble to shake them off, or too listless to resist .... It will be extremely difficult to
change it for the better even in the beginning; but in a little time it will become utterly
impossible."); Edmund Randolph to Speaker of Virginia House of Delegates (October 10,
1787), reprinted in 4 Founders' Constitution, supra note 18, at 659 (" [I]t may be question-
able, whether, after the particular advantages of its operation shall be discerned, three
fourths of the States can be induced to amend.").
133. Il FARRAND, supra note 9, at 123.
134. CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 34-35.
135. Id. at 35.
136. Robert Allen Rutland, The Ordeal of the Constitution 188 (Oklahoma Press, 1966)
(hereinafter cited as "RUTLAND").
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until March 7, 1788.137 The delay' 38 prevented New York's legislature
from acting in concert with Virginia.139 Clinton's response of promising
his cooperation "with any sister State" was received by Randolph but not
delivered to the Virginia legislature until, two days before the state con-
vention's vote on ratification.140 The Virginia delegates first learned of
Clinton's letter the day after they had voted to ratify when it was read to
the legislature.141 Virginia eventually sent its reply to Clinton and sought
to coordinate a call for a second federal convention, but this message too
was somehow 'delayed; months after the resolution had been posted in
Richmond it was still undelivered in New York. 142 Given their size and
political importance, the new Constitution could not have been successful
without the support of New York and Virginia and had it not been for
these crucial delays, a second convention would have been inevitable. 143
Even after the Constitution went into effect,144 there were continued
calls for a second convention. On October 30, 1788, the Virginia House of
Delegates approved Patrick Henry's measure calling for a second conven-
tion. 145 In tandem with its ratification notice, New York circulated a letter
to the governors of each state, requesting that Congress call a second con-
vention. 146 The New York legislature passed its resolution for a second
convention on February 7, 1789.147 On November 21, in the second of
two conventions, North Carolina voted to ratify the Constitution and rec-
ommended amendments to be obtained through a second federal conven-
tion. 148
137. Id.
138. Given the rapidity at which the contemporary events were unfolding, the numerous
delays in the transmission of the letters are somewhat suspicious, to say the least. See
RUTLAND, supra note 136, at 188; CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 35.
139. Caplan supra note 2, at 35; RUTLAND, supra note 123, at 188.
140. Ironically, so intense was the interest in the state convention's proceedings, the
Virginia legislature was unable to obtain a quorum-and thus consider the letter-until after
the convention rejected Patrick Henry's passionate arguments and voted to unconditionally
ratify the Constitution. Edward P. Smith, The Movement Towards a Second Constitutional
Convention in /788, reprinted in Essays in the Constititional History of the United States in
the Formative Period. 1775-1789 88-89 (John F. Jameson, ed. 1889).
141. CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 35; RUTLAND, supra note 123, at 252.
142. RUTLAND, supra note 123, at 252.
143. CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 35.
144. Occurring on June 21, 1788, when New Hamphire became the ninth state to ratify
the Constitution.
145. CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 36; Smith, stpra note 140, at 104. Francis Corbin twice
moved to amend the measure and allow Congress to propose its own amendments as an
alternative to calling a convention; his proposal was voted down both times. CAPLAN,
supra note 2, at 36-37.
146. Id. at 37. Upon hearing of the circular letter, Washington commented the circular
was designed to "set every thing afloat again." George Washington to Benjamin Lincoln
(August 28, 1788), cited in CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 37.
147. Id. at 38.
148. Id.
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Madison, aware that delay could cause the Antifederalists to "blow
the trumpet for a second Convention," 149 urged the First Congress to pro-
pose amendments to the new Constitution. 150 Representative Gerry
believed the proposed amendments would "prevent the necessity which
the States may think themselves under of calling a new convention." 151
Ironically, the Federalists cited Article V's cumbersome convention
mechanisms as a reason for allowing the Congress to propose amend-
ments rather than taking the time-consuming route of a national conven-
tion. 152 By the time Congress submitted to the states for ratification the
amendments now known as the Bill of Rights, calls for a second conven-
tion had ceased.153
IV
The Federalist Critique of National Conventions
Although he did not believe it was necessary to make constitutional
provision for future conventions, Madison, nevertheless, embraced the
principle of popular sovereignty. After having the people meet in conven-
tion to ratify the Constitution would not only erase whatever concerns
remained about the legality of the Philadelphia Convention, 154 it would
also trump the amendment procedures in state constitutions.1 55 In fact, it
149. James Madison to Richard Peters (August 19, 1789), cited in CAPLAN, supra note
2, at 39. In a letter to George Eve, Madison wrote that he preferred congressional proposal of
amendments to a second convention because of the time required for the convention process
and the fact that some states would oppose the convention mode. Moreover, congressional
proposal was "the safest mode. The Congress, who will be appointed to execute as well as to
amend the Government, will probably be careful not to destroy or endanger it." Letter to
George Eve (Jan. 2, 1789), reprinted in, Paul J. Weber & Barbara A. Perry, Unfounded
Fears: Myths and Realities of a Constitutional Convention 53 n.51 (1989) (hereinafter cited
as "WEBER" & PERRY").
150. 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 86, at 983. Others have noted how concerns about a sec-
ond convention played a role in Madison's willingness to propose the amendments that
became the Bill of Rights. See WEBER & PERRY, supra note 149, at 48; Sanford Levinson,
"Veneration" and Constitutional Change: Janles Madison Confronts the Possibility of
Constitutional Amendment, 21 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 2443, 2454 (1990).
151. 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 86, at 1037.
152. According to Madison, congressional proposal of amendments was "the expeditious
mode. A convention must be delayed, until 2/3 of the State Legislatures shall have applied
for one; and afterwards the amendments must be submitted to the States; whereas if the busi-
ness be undertaken by Congress the amendments may be prepared and submitted in March
next." Letter to George Eve (Jan. 2, 1789), repr inted in WEBER & PERRY, supra note 149,
at 53 n.5 1.
153. CAPLAN, supna note 2, at 40.
154. The Federalist No. 40 (James Madison), supra note 8, at 253.
155. Responding in Philadelphia to a delegate's complaint that Article V violated his
state's procedures for constitutional amendment, Madison replied, "Itihe difficulty in
Maryland was no greater than in other States, where no mode of change was pointed out by
the Constitution, and all officers were under oath to support it. The people were in fact, the
fountain of all power, and by resorting to them, all difficulties were got over. They could
alter constitutions as they pleased. It was a principle in the Bill of rights, that first principles
might be resorted to." 11 FARRAND, supra note 9, at 476.
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is at least plausible the Preamble and Assembly Clause presented by
Madison to the First Congress were intended to explicitly recognize the
people's right to assemble in convention and alter or abolish their
Constitution.
But not right now. First principles notwithstanding, there was too
much at stake to chance another convention before the results of the first
had been tested by time. Moreover, the very concept of convention raised
Madisonian concerns regarding faction and demagoguery. Not only was a
convention at the moment imprudent, the arguments deployed by the
Federalists called into question whether a convention at any time could be
trusted to produce the considered judgment of the people.
A. Concerns of the Moment
The Federalists opposed a second convention for a variety of rea-
sons-some having nothing to do with conventions per se. For example,
many believed a second convention was unlikely to bring together a group
of men better qualified to create a new system of government than those
who met in Philadelphia. The original convention was made up of "first
characters,"' 56 who constituted "the wisdom of America."' 57 Accordingly,
"another convention in all respects equal to the present cannot
be found;"1 58 "[a] second group would "inevitably be inferior to the
first."159 Indeed, the people's "enthusiastic confidence" in these "patriotic
leaders, . . . stifled the ordinary diversity of opinions on great national
questions."' 60 Given the superior quality of the men at Philadelphia, a sec-
ond convention could not hope to have the same "spirit of amity" or the
same "mutual deference and concession" that accompanied the first. 61
On the other hand, a second convention right now would include
"insidious characters from different parts of America, would at least
spread a general alarm, and be but too likely to turn everything into con-
fusion and uncertainty."' 62 The opposition was made up of"Nabobs" who
"appearfl to proceed in the present instance from no good motive."1 63 A
156. Astrides, Rernarks on the Proposed Plan of a Federal Government (January 31 -
March 27, /788), reprinted in COMMENTARIES (3), supra note 73, at 540.
157. Id. at 541.
158. Observer V, New Haven Gazette (September 20, 27, 1787), reprinted in Ill
Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution, supra note 73, at 350.
159. Astrides, supra note 195, at 540.
160. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, sulnpa note 8, at 315.
161. George Washington, Letter to Congress (September 17, 1787), reprinted in I1
FARRAND, supra note 9, at 667). See also, Astrides, supra note 195, at 541. See also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 85, supra note 8 at 524 (noting the "improbability of assembling a new
convention under circumstances in any degree so favorable to a happy issue as those in
which the late convention met, deliberated, and concluded").
162. 5 The Writings of Janies Madison 321 (G. Hunt ed., 1904), cited in Walter
Dellinger, The Recurring Question of the "Limited" Constitution Convention, 88 Yale L. J.
1623, 1634 n.47 (1979).
163. Rufus King to Jeremiah Wadsworth (December 23, 1787), reprinted in COM-
MENTARIES (3), supra note 73, at 70-71.
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second convention would "give opportunities to designing men" 164 who
would use their influence to "cause instructions to be given which would
effectually prevent an ageament [sic]."1 65 According to Madison, "[i]f an
early convention cannot be parried, it is seriously to be feared that the sys-
tem which has resisted so many direct attacks may at last be undermined
by its enemies." 166
Moreover, regardless of one's belief that the Constitution could use
amending, the timing was wrong. The Constitution was too young to face
the fundamental challenge the Antifederalists would mount in a second
convention. Madison believed that, "as every appeal to the people would
carry an implication of some defect in the government, frequent appeals
would, in great measure, deprive the government of that veneration which
time bestows on everything, and without which perhaps the wisest and
freest governments would not possess the requisite stability."167 To even
attempt a second convention "strikes at the confidence in the first; and the
existence of a second by opposing influence to influence, would in a man-
ner destroy an effectual confidence in either."168 Calling a convention at
this point would lead to "anarchy, civil war, a perpetual alienation of the
States from each other, and perhaps the military despotism of a victorious
demagogue."1 69
The fact that the Constitution remained untested also meant that a
second convention would necessarily be more a debate over political the-
ory than an attempt to remedy a concrete problem. Unfortunately,
"[h]uman opinions" were "as various and irreconcilable concerning theo-
ries of Government, as doctrines in Religion." 7 0 "[D]issensions on the
Subject will beget heats and animosities, that would in case of another
convention prevent a general acquiescence [sic] in any plan."' 7' The fact
164. James Madison to Edmund Randolph (New York, January 10, 1788), reprinted in
COMMENTARIES (3), supra note 73, at 327.
165. From Henry Knox (New York, September 1787), reprinted in Commentaries (1).
supra note 73, at 280.
166. 2 Rives's Madison 629, reprinted in Edward P. Smith, The Movement Towards a
Second Constitutional Conlvention in /788, in Essays in the Constitutional History of the
United States in the Formative Period, 1775-1789 95 (John F. Jameson ed., 1889). See also
The Federalist No. 85. supra note 8 at 527 ("1 know that POWERFUL INDIVIDUALS, in
this and other States, are enemies to a general national government in every possible
shape.") (capitalization in original).
167. The Federalist No. 49. supra note 8 at 314. See also. Levinson, suplra note 150 at
2459 (arguing that Madisonian concerns about "veneration" of the document have con-
tributed to "a process of surreptitious and unacknowledged amendment").
168. James Madison to Edmund Randolph (New York, January 10, 1788). reprinted in
COMMENTARIES (3), supra note 73, at 327. Madison also argued there was danger in
calling a convention to amend so young a constitution.
169. The Federalist No. 85 (Hamilton), supra note 8 at 527.
170. James Madison to Edmund Randolph (New York, January 10, 1788), reprinted in
COMMENTARIES (3), supra note 73, at 327.
171. From Henry Knox (New York, September 1787), reprinted in COMMENTARIES
(I), supra note 73, at 280.
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that the previous convention had escaped such discord was attributed both
to the men who attended itl72 and the fact that positions had since become
polarized.1 73 Given the "difficulties and dangers experienced by .the first
Convention, which assembled under every propitious circumstance,"
Madison "tremble[d] for the result of a Second, meeting in present temper
of America." 174
B. Theoretical Concerns
1. Liberalism and the Assumption of Faction
Originally, the convention's glory was its status as an extra-institu-
tional, therefore super-legitimate expression of the will of the people
themselves. 175 Implicit in this idea is the faith that one group can repre-
sent the will of the people-it assumes a certain degree of commonality.
In fact, the Antifederalist call for a second convention explicitly adopted
the Republican ideal that citizens are able to put aside parochial concerns
and seek the common good. 176 Madison himself recognized that, under
"certain great and extraordinary occasions," the people could assemble in
convention and "repress[] the passions most unfriendly to order and con-
cord."' 77 However, this was the exception. To Madison, "[t]he danger of
172. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
173. James Madison to G. L. Turberville (New York, November 2, 1788), reprinted il
WEBER & PERRY, supra note 149, at 31-32 (election to a second convention "would be
courted by the most violent partizans on both sides; it would probably consist of the most
heterogeneous characters; land I would be the very focus of that flame which had already too
much heated men of all parties.").
174. Id.
175. According to Charles Jarvis in the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention:
Let us inquire, then, sir, under what authority we are acting, and to what tri-
bunal we are amenable. Is it, then, sir, from the late federal Convention that we
derive that authority? Is it from Congress, or is it even from the legislature itself?
It is from neither, sir. We are convened in right of the people, as their immediate
representatives, to execute the most important trust which it is possible to
receive; we are accountable, in its execution, to God only, and our own con-
sciences."
2 ELLIOT'S DEBATES, supra note 7, at 151. Madison also equated conventions with "the
people." See II FARRAND, supra note 9, at 476 ("Mr. Madison comsidered it best to
require Conventions [for ratifying the Constitution] .... The people were in fact, the foun-
tain of all power, and by resorting to them, all difficulties were got over. They could alter
constitutions as they pleased."); The Federalist No. 40, supra note 8, at 251 ("In one particu-
lar it is admitted that the convention have departed from the tenor of their commission.
Instead of reporting a plan requiring the confirmation of all the States, they have reported a
plan which is to be confirmed and may be carried into effect by nine States only."). See also
Bruce A. Ackerman, We the People: Foundations 178 (1991) (discussing how Publius
equated "convention" with "the people.").
176. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
177. The Federalist No. 49, supra note 8 at 314, 315. This "repression of factionalism"
occurs only in times of crisis when there is "a universal alarm for the public safety." The
Federalist No. 50, supra note 8 at 320. In these extraordinary times, "an enthusiastic confi-
dence of the people in their patriotic leaders" could "stifle[] ordinary diversity of opinions
on great national questions." The Federalist No. 49, supra note 8 at 315.
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disturbing the public tranquility by interesting too strongly the public pas-
sions" was a "serious objection against a frequent reference of constitu-
tional questions to the decisions of the whole society."1 78 Accordingly,
such "experiments [were] of too ticklish a nature to be unnecessarily mul-
tiplied."179
Madison spoke from contemporary experience. In the decade follow-
ing the Revolution, the track record of the state legislatures provided less
reason to see society in terms of majorities acting for the common good
and more reason to see competing factional interests that had to be con-
trolled through institutional safeguards.180 "Wherever the real power in a
Government lies," Madison wrote to Thomas Jefferson, "there is the dan-
ger of oppression. In our Governments the real power lies in the majority
of the Community, and the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be
apprehended, not from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its
constituents, but from the acts in which the Government is the mere
instrument of the major number of the constituents."'81
A liberal gloss was thus added to the Republican assumptions which
had informed the Revolution. 182 Republicanism, at the time of Founding,
trusted in an organic state where the goal of society was the pursuit of the
common good and promotion of public virtue; 183 this assumes a common-
ality of interest among the people which could be determined by majority
vote. 184 Under this view, there is no reason to question the decisions of
the people meeting in convention-indeed, there was more reason to trust
them, given the reduced "agency costs" inherent in normal representative
government.1 85 However, the idea of a homogeneous society was explicit-
178. The Federalist No. 49, supra note 8 at 315.
179. Id. Indeed, Federalist No. 51 presents a system of government where separation of
powers prevents the necessity of having to resort to such "ticklish experiments."
180. For a general discussion of legislative excesses in the 1780s, see WOOD, supra note
3, at 411.
181. James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (October 17, 1788), cited in WOOD, supra
note 3, at 410.
182. This does not mean that Liberalism replaced Republicanism, or that there exists a
sharp dichotomy between the two. See Ackennan, supra note 175 at 31 (rejecting dichotomy
and interpreting Madison and the Founder as embracing a form of "liberal republicanism);
Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 Yale L.J. 1539 (1988) (same). It does
mean, however, that Madisonian notions of politics-as-faction played a far greater role in the
1780s than in 1776. See WOOD, supra note 3, at 606-15 (discussing the shift from classical
Republicanism to emerging Liberalism). See also Note, The Origins and Original
Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the Fijfh Amendment, 94 Yale L.J. 694, 704
(1985) (same).
183. WOOD, supra note 2, at 68.
184. Id.
185. See Amar, supra note 50, at 1094. An example of republicanism's sanguine view of
conventions are the remarks of Thomas Jefferson after the deadlocked election of 1800.
Facing the possibility that the present administration might expire without a new president,
Jefferson believed a constitutional convention was a real possibility. See CAPLAN, supra,
note 2, at 43. According to Jefferson, this possibility gave the Federalists "the horrors, as in
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ly rejected by Founders such as John Adams and James Madison who
believed society was composed of groups whose interests normally
diverged.186 This rejection had tremendous implications for Madison's
faith in conventions as a tool for producing the considered judgment of
the people.
2. Madisonian Factionalism and the Theory of Convention
At Philadelphia, Madison expressed his concerns about conventions
in relatively benign terms. He was troubled by "the vagueness of the
terms, 'call a convention for the purpose' as sufficient reason for recon-
sidering the article. How was a Convention to be formed? by what rule
decide? what the force of its acts?"1 87 Although not opposed to conven-
tions as such, Madison was concerned that "difficulties might arise as to
the form, the quorum, &c. which in Constitutional regulations ought to be
as much as possible avoided." 88
These criticisms are deceptively innocuous. Only later, in his contri-
butions to the Federalist Papers, did Madison have a chance to elaborate
on his concerns regarding the "formation and force" of conventions. In
Papers 49 and 50, Madison critiques the utility of appealing to the people
in convention as a means of preventing the departments of government
from overreaching their authority.18 9 Although Madison agreed that "a
constitutional road to the decision of the people ought to be marked out
and kept open, for certain great and extraordinary occasions,"190 he con-
sidered this road too dangerous for "frequent reference of constitutional
questions to the decision of the whole society." For one thing, frequent
appeals to the people would "deprive the government of that veneration
which time bestows on everything, and without which perhaps the wisest
the present democratical spirit of America, they fear they should lose some of the favorite
morsels of the Constitution." Id. Jefferson, on the other hand, believed a convention "would
have been on the ground in 8 weeks, would have repaired the Constitution where it was
defective, & wound it up again." Id.
186. See WOOD, stupra note 3, at 502.
187. 11 FARRAND, supra note 9, at 558. At the time Madison made this comment, the
proposed Article read: "On the application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the States in
the Union, for an amendment of this Constitution, the Legislature of the United States shall
call a Convention for that purpose." Id. at 468. Note that the final form of Article V appears
to address only the last of Madison's concerns, "what force of its acts'?" by requiring state
ratification.
188. II FARRAND supra note 9, at 630.
189. In The Federalist 49, Madison discusses Jefferson's proposition "that whenever any
two of the three branches of government shall concur in opinion, each by the voices of two
thirds of their whole number, that a convention is necessary for altering the Constitution, or
correcting breaches ofit, a convention shall be called for the purpose." The Federalist No.
49, supra note 8, at 313 (emphasis in original). In Paper No. 50, Madison discusses
Pennsylvania's method of periodic resort to convention. Id. at 318.
190. The Federalist No. 49, supra note 8, at 314.
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and freest governments would not possess the requisite stability."19'
Madison's biggest concerns, however, were with the formation of
conventions. Future conventions would have to contend with the people's
ordinary diversity of opinion which "could mingle its leaven in the opera-
tion." Madison reminded the readers of the Federalist Papers that
although "all the existing constitutions were formed in the midst of a dan-
ger which repressed the passions most unfriendly to order and concord,"
"future situations in which we must expect to be usually placed do not
present any equivalent security." 192 There were institutional concerns as
well. Despite the fact that calls to convention would most likely be pro-
voked by the actions of a self-aggrandizing legislature, the legislature,
nevertheless, would have the greatest influence over that convention. In
fact, the same influence which had gained them an election into the legis-
lature would gain them a seat in the convention." 193
Even in those situations where the legislature had less influence,
conventions "could never be expected to turn on the true merits of the
question. It would inevitably be connected with the spirit of pre-existing
parties or of parties springing out of the question itself," and would be
"connected with persons of distinguished character and extensive influ-
ence in the community." 194 In short,"[t]he passion, therefore, and not the
reason,of the public would sit in judgment. But it is the reason, alone, of
the public, that ought to control and regulate the government."195
Madison's point is to show that a convention is an inadequate," exte-
rior provisions" for keeping the departments of government responsive to
the people. He solves this problem in Paper No. 51 "by so contriving the
interior structure of government as that its several constitutional parts
191. Id. See also James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (June 27, 1823), reprinted in 9
Writings of Madison at 140-141 (G. Hunt ed.), cited in CAPLAN, supra note 2, at 49 ("To
refer every point of disagreement to the people in Conventions would be a process too tardy,
too troublesome, & too expensive; besides its tendency to lessen a salutary veneration for an
instrument so often calling for such explanatory interpositions.").
192. The Federalist No. 49, supra note 8, at 315.
193. Id. at 315-16.
194. Id. at 317. In a letter to George Turberville, Madison wrote:
If a general Convention were to take place for the avowed and sole purpose of revising the
Constitution, it would naturally consider itself as having greater latitude than the Congress
appointed to administer and support as well as to amend the system; it would consequently
give greater agitation to the public mind; and election into it would be courted by the most
violent partizans on both sides; it would probably consist of the most heterogeneous charac-
ters: would be the very focus of that flame which had already too much heated men of all
parties; would no doubt contain individuals of insidious views, who under the mask of seek-
ing alterations popular in some parts but inadmissible in others parts of the union might have
a dangerous opportunity of sapping the very foundation of the fabric.
Letter to George Lee Turberville (Nov. 2, 1788), reprinted in WEBER & PERRY, supra
note 149 at 31-32. See also Edward Carrington to Thomas Jefferson (New York, October 23,
1787), reprinted in COMMENTARIES (1), supra note 73, at 440 (future conventions could
expect to be "clogged with instructions and biased by the presentiments of their con-
stituents").
195. The Federalist No. 49, supra note 8, at 317.
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may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their
proper places."' 96 By structuring the processes of government so that
"ambition is made to counteract ambition," Madison minimizes the need
for "frequent reference of constitutional questions to the decision of the
whole society." The danger of conventions, however, is left unsolved.
Although one might hope future conventions will be formed under cir-
cumstances that "repress the passions most unfriendly to order and con-
cord," there is no guarantee that this will be the case. 197 Madison himself
believed the extinction of "party spirit" required "either a universal alarm
for the public safety, or an absolute extinction of liberty."198 Nor are there
structural safeguards within the convention itself that ensure-or even
make likely-an outcome that will reflect more "reason" than "passion."
Suddenly, Madison's concerns about how conventions are formed,
by what rule decided, and what force of its acts, appear quite serious
indeed. It is no wonder that Madison's proposed version of Article V
avoided conventions altogether and left the matter of constitutional
amendment to the Congress "who will be appointed to execute as well as
to amend the Government [and] will probably be careful not to destroy or
endanger it."199
C. Beyond the Founding
The dangers associated with "passionate," popular assemblies were
more than theoretical. In the period between the Revolution and the adop-
tion of the Constitution, there had been increasing concern regarding
extra-institutional assemblies. 200 By the turn of the century, the great
upheaval in France highlighted the American advantage of having a "reg-
ular and legal mode" for altering fundamental law.20t It also gave a subtle
196. The Federalist No. 51, supra note 8, at 320 (emphasis added).
197. Some scholars have characterized Madison's concerns about conventions as being
limited to technical problems and the disadvantages to calling a second convention before
the new Constitution had been properly tested. See WEBER & PERRY, supra note 149, at
48. This does not explain Madison's continued suspicion of national conventions-a suspi-
cion that lasted well into the Nineteenth Century and long after the Constitution had sur-
vived multiple amendments. See Letter to Thomas Jefferson (June 27, 1823) (conventions
are "a process too tardy, too troublesome, and too expensive," and have a "tendency to
lessen a salutary veneration for an Instrument so often calling for explanatory interposi-
tions"), reprinted in Levinson, supra note 150, at 2452 n.20. Nor does it address the theoreti-
cal problems with conventions described by Madison in The Federalist Papers.
198. The Federalist No. 50, supra note 149, at 320.
199. 5 The Writings of James Madison 321 (G. Hunt ed. 1904).
200. See Letter of James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Aug. 12, 1786), reprinted in
WOOD, supra note 3, at 327 [Unauthorized assemblies] were "continually starting up here
or there, and carried on merely as the gnawing worm of malice or resentment may bite indi-
viduals.").
201. See St. George Tucker, I Blackstone's Commentaries 371-72 (1803), reprinted in 4
Founders' Constitution, supra note 18, at 583 ("A change in governments in other countries
is almost always attended with convulsions which threaten its entire dissolution; and with
scenes of horror, which deter mankind from any attempt to correct abuses, or remove
oppressions until they have become altogether intolerable.").
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impetus towards using the congressional mode of amendment and away
from utilizing conventions. In his widely-used edition of Blackstone's
Commentaries, St. George Tucker noted that a national convention "will
probably never be resorted to, unless the federal government should
betray symptoms of corruption, which may render it expedient for the
states to exert themselves in order to the application of some radical and
effectual remedy." 202
By the mid-nineteenth century, legal treatises described national
conventions as "without limit and without landmark" and "not likely to be
resorted to for any other purpose than to destroy the government. "203
Writing soon after the Civil War and the Southern secession conventions,
John A. Jameson commented that the convention was "an institution that,
however hedged about by legal restraints, obviously exhibits more fea-
tures that are menacing to republican liberty than any other in our whole
political structure." 204
It would appear these warnings have been heeded. In the two hun-
dred years since the ratification of Article V, state applications for a
national convention have never reached the two-thirds majority required
to force Congress to call a national convention. 205 It would seem Charles
Pinckney's words were prophetic: "Conventions are serious things, and
ought not to be repeated."206
202. Id.
203. Timothy Faffar, Manual of the Constitution of the United States of Amnerica 392
(Boston, 1867), cited in CAPLAN supra note 2, at 158. Timothy Faffar was Daniel
Webster's law partner and is described by Russell Caplan as "an ardent Unionist." Id. John
C. Calhoun apparently shared Farrar's conception of the authority of national conventions,
but without the pejorative. See The Works of John C. Calhoun,. reprinted in VILE, supra
note 6 at 87 (arguing that a national convention "represent[ed] the united sovereignty of the
confederated States" and had "power and authority to correct every error").
204. John A. Jameson, A Treatise On Constitutional Conventions 2 (4th ed. 1887).
Jameson believed there were four types of conventions: the "spontaneous convention" or
public meeting (protected by the First Amendment Assembly Clause); the ordinary legisla-
tive convention or "General Assembly"; the revolutionary convention or "provisional gov-
ernment"; and the constitutional convention (as described in Article V). Id. at 3-4. Jameson
believed it was a mistake to equate constitutional conventions with the people acting in the
sovereign capacity. This was a "heresy" that could "pull down the edifice of our libertlies"
and, in fact, described the actions of the southern states during the Civil War. Id. at 3.
205. The method has come close to being invoked on several occasions. Only one state
was needed to trigger a national convention when Congress permitted passage of an amend-
ment providing for the direct elections of Senators. See The Constitution qfthe United States
of America: Analysis and Interpretation 902 (Johnny H. Killian & Leland E. Beck eds.,
1987). The movement for a constitutional limitation on income tax rates lacked only two
states to force a convention. Id. Only one state was needed to force a convention to consider
limiting the Supreme Court's legislative apportionment decisions. Id. In our own time, only
two states are needed to for a convention to propose a balanced budget amendment. Id.
206. II FARRAND, supra note 9, at 632. But see ACKERMAN, supra note 70 (arguing
that certain political movements have acted analogously to the convention procedure set out
in Article V).
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Conclusion: Retaining Conventional Wisdom
The essence of federalist ambivalence regarding conventions is this:
Although the people are capable of repressing the passions most unfriend-
ly to "order and concord" in times of constitutional crisis, there is no
guarantee, they will do so. Therefore, better to trust future constitutional
innovation to the existing institutions of government. The federalists,
however, did not have the last word. A more Republican view of the peo-
ple-a view less trusting of existing institutions-refused to grant
Congress a monopoly on proposals for constitutional reform. If the view
of society-as-faction was integrated into the Constitution in its structured
separation of powers, so too was the Republican ideal of a people capable
of acting in the interest of all on certain great and extraordinary occasions.
"Great and extraordinary occasions," however, are not a prerequisite
to a national convention. 207 The two modes of amendment presented in
Article V are always available. One mode allows the people to channel
their desires to amend the Constitution through normal political institu-
tions; the other mode assumes the people are just as capable as their insti-
tutions in wielding this extraordinary power in the name of the common
good. There is no preference in the Article itself-no exhaustion require-
ment that the people mustfirst try Congress, then, if unavailing, they may
resort to convention. Article V simply presents both modes, both ideals,
and leaves the choice to the exigencies of the time.
In fact, the choices of Article V create a peculiar constitutional
dynamic. Madison may have hoped that by granting Congress the power
to propose amendments, the country could avoid the trauma of another
convention. In fact, it is the convention clause itself that makes conven-
tions unlikely. The option of a convention serves as a reminder to
Congress that it cannot ignore widespread and sustained calls for constitu-
tional reform.208 In this way, the Convention Clause guarantees that the
207. Interestingly enough, the occasions generating the most calls for constitutional con-
ventions could well be characterized as "great and extraordinary." The first call to a conven-
tion after the Founding period came in the winter of 1832-33 during the nullification crisis
when the national tariff enacted by Congress prompted some states to question whether the
states had the authority to nullify congressional acts they considered unconstitutional.
WEBER & PERRY, supra note 149, at 59 . The next wave of petitions occurred on the eve
of the Civil War when several states sought a convention to avert the impending rebellion
over slavery. Id. Other events generating a significant number of petitions include the
Progressive Movement (calling for direct election of Senators), World War I & II (seeking
to outlaw war), and Desegregation (following the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v.
Board of Education). Id. at 61-64.
208. Consider, for example, the Seventeenth Amendment. In the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century, Congress received numerous petitions calling for a convention to consider
amending the Constitution to allow the direct election of Senators. Initially blocking
attempts at such an amendment, the Senate eventually acquiesced and adopted a joint resolu-
tion with the House proposing the Seventeenth Amendment. According to some scholars,
this "handwriting on the wall syndrome," in which state applications occasionally influenced
Congress to take action on an issue, is "'a familiar tendency in twentieth century constitution-
al revision." WEBER & PERRY, supra note 149, at 61.
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Constitution remains in the hands of the people, not their institutions, and
that the people retain the right to alter or abolish that Constitution as they
see fit.
